China’s DF-61 ICBM and US nuke silo vulnerability
Why China’s DF-61 ICBM matters
China rolled out a new road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missile at its 3 September 2025 parade: China’s DF-61 ICBM. Footage and expert readings place it alongside the DF-31BJ and JL-3, signalling a nuclear role and a maturing triad. The launcher closely resembles the DF-41 TEL, hinting at shared lineage and MIRV potential, though payload and range remain unconfirmed. Federation of American Scientists
China’s arsenal is expanding rapidly, with analysts estimating several hundred warheads today and continued growth ahead. The parade also showcased a JL-1 air-launched ballistic missile for H-6N bombers, rounding out nuclear delivery options. China’s DF-61 ICBM thus arrives as both symbol and enabler of that shift. Federation of American Scientists Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
Mobility vs silos: the survivability math
Beijing prizes mobility for one reason: surviving a first strike. CASI research notes that road-mobile brigades can disperse, hide in “field” sites, and maintain credible second-strike options. That logic underpins China’s DF-61 ICBM and the long PLARF drive toward solid-fuel, off-road TELs. Air University
In contrast, the Cold War experiments conducted by the U.S. with road-mobile and tunnel basing proved to be costly and unwieldy, leading Washington to refocus on silos. CRS’s baseline assessment still stands: mobile basing raised complexity without clear affordability. This divergence elucidates why China’s DF-61 ICBM defies U.S. expectations. FAS Project on Government Secrecy
Capabilities context and open questions
Imagery shows DF-61 TELs carrying canisters with DF-61 markings, but the hardware inside remains unknown. Analysts look at the outside size of the DF-61 and compare it to the DF-41, which can travel 12,000 Even so, the DF-31BJ appearance, plus the JL-3 SLBM display, indicates broader force modernization around China’s DF-61 ICBM. Federation of American Scientists
Separately, open-source work this year detailed ongoing silo programs and DF-31-class loading patterns, reinforcing the picture of a mixed road-mobile and silo force. That mix raises U.S. targeting costs and compresses warning timelines—another reason China’s DF-61 ICBM matters for planners. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
The U.S. posture: Sentinel, New START, and risk
Washington is replacing Minuteman III with the LGM-35A Sentinel, a program intended to serve into the 2070s. Under New START, the U.S. historically kept one warhead on each ICBM; the treaty expires on 5 February 2026, potentially reopening MIRV debates. Those choices shape how China’s DF-61 ICBM interacts with U.S. force design. Congress.gov U.S. Department of State
For scale, the United States disclosed a stockpile of 3,748 warheads as of September 2023—far larger than China’s but distributed across a diverse triad. However, the raw totals fail to eliminate the basing vulnerabilities that China’s DF-61 ICBM aims to exploit. The Department of Energy’s Energy.gov
Can missile defense save the silos?
In May 2025, the U.S. administration unveiled the “Golden Dome” concept: a layered homeland shield linking space sensors, kinetic interceptors, and directed-energy systems. Advocates argue such a system could improve ICBM-field survival and blunt attacks that China’s DF-61 ICBM might enable. The White House/Reuters
Yet the American Physical Society’s 2025 study highlights hard physics limits. Boost-phase windows last for only a few minutes; midcourse defence encounters decoys and clutter; and terminal defense protects only small areas. The report’s bottom line is sobering: technology and cost hurdles remain steep, even as threats grow. That finding restrains hopes that missile defense alone can offset China’s DF-61 ICBM. Cloudinary American Physical Society
Hypersonics and conventional counter-silo strikes
Carnegie’s 2022 analysis warned that hypersonic boost-glide systems might enable non-nuclear attacks on U.S. silos within decades, complicating crisis decision-making and raising “use-or-lose” pressures. In that environment, China’s DF-61 ICBM and other mobile forces become more central to survivable deterrence calculations on both sides. Carnegie Endowment
A mobile hedge for America?
Given emerging detection tech, AI-enhanced sensing, and OSINT, oceans may grow less opaque for SSBNs. CGSR argues a limited U.S. road-mobile ICBM leg could provide a supplemental second strike, ease launch-on-warning pressures, and diversify targets. The case is not cost-free, but it directly addresses the vulnerabilities that China’s DF-61 ICBM was built to exploit. cgsr.llnl.gov
Bottom line
Mass and mobility are not mutually exclusive; China is buying both. China’s DF-61 ICBM underscores a survivability-first strategy that blends mobile TELs, new silos, and maturing sea- and air-based legs.
For the United States, the credible response may combine Sentinel recapitalisation, measured missile-defense gains, and—controversially—a mobile hedge. The next deterrent contest will reward forces that can ride out the first punch and still land the second.
References
- Federation of American Scientists – Nuclear Weapons at China’s 2025 Victory Day Parade (parade, DF-61/DF-31BJ/JL-3 details): https://fas.org/publication/nuclear-weapons-at-chinas-2025-victory-day-parade/
- Carnegie Endowment – Assessing U.S. Options for the Future of the ICBM Force (hypersonic/silo vulnerability): https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2022/09/assessing-us-options-for-the-future-of-the-icbm-force
- APS Panel on Public Affairs – Strategic Ballistic Missile Defense (2025 report on boost/midcourse/terminal limits): https://www.aps.org/publications/reports/strategic-ballistic-missile-defense
- CRS – U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Developments, and Issues (mobile basing costs and impracticality): https://sgp.fas.org/crs/nuke/RL33640.pdf
