North Korea Tests MiG-29 Air-to-Air Missile

On May 17, 2025, North Korea unveiled a new active radar-guided air-to-air missile for its MiG-29s. Kim Jong Un oversaw the event during a visit to the KPA Air Force’s 1st Guards Air Division. The unveiling was a major step in Pyongyang’s push to modernise its ageing air force.

South Korea, Japan, and the United States are among the regional powers that have expressed concern about this development, which replaces the country’s ageing short-range air combat capability with advanced beyond-visual-range (BVR) weapons. This action can shift the balance of power in the Korean skies and shows North Korea’s resolve to expand its military capabilities in the face of economic woes and international sanctions.

The new missile is a significant upgrade for the air force of North Korea, which has had to depend on ageing Soviet-style technology. State media photos released officially depict a MiG-29 launching the missile. The Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) claims North Korea produced the missile domestically, despite its close resemblance to China’s PL-12 and America’s AIM-120 AMRAAM.

This missile, with a range of 90–120 kilometres, outperforms the older R-27s by using active radar guidance. Unlike the R-27’s semi-active system, the new missile can track and hit targets independently after launch, boosting MiG-29 effectiveness.

State media reported the test-fire as successful, along with the release of images showing Kim inspecting the weapons and precision-guided air-to-ground weaponry. The test indicated an enhancement in North Korea’s space technology.

The MiG-29 Fulcrum

Its platform, the MiG-29, is a twin-engine fourth-generation fighter constructed during the 1970s by the Soviet Mikoyan-Gurevich design bureau in an attempt to match American planes like the F-16 Fighting Falcon and F-15 Eagle. Sunchon Airbase, approximately 30 miles north of Pyongyang, houses the majority of North Korea’s 35–40 MiG-29s.

Developed in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the planes have models like the upgraded MiG-29S-13 and the MiG-29 9.12B, with others assembled locally from kits sent by the Soviet Union. The combat range of the MiG-29 is about 430 miles, and it has a top speed of Mach 2.25, enabled by its two Klimov RD-33 turbofan engines.

While advanced for its era, its avionics feature an infrared search and track (IRST) passive detection system and the N019 Slot Back radar, which has multiple target detection capabilities up to 62 miles. While the new missile significantly enhances the jet’s kill capability, its armament typically consists of a 30mm GSh-30-1 cannon and pylon-mounted missiles like the R-60 and R-27.

As a result of sanctions and the demise of the Soviet Union, the air force of North Korea has historically been constrained by its ability to procure ageing aircraft and spare parts in limited quantities. The Korean People’s Army Air Force [KPAF] has dedicated decades to investing in air defence following the discovery of the disastrous effects of losing air superiority during the Korean War.

North Korea is the sole foreign purchaser of the S-25 surface-to-air missile system, an advanced platform originally provided by the Soviet Union. Although Pyongyang integrated MiG-15s, MiG-17s, MiG-19s, and MiG-21s into its air-to-air fighter fleet in the Cold War era, the MiG-29 is its most advanced asset.

The KPAF

With its average annual operating hours at a mere 15, it is estimated that a minor fraction of the KPAF’s over 400 combat aircraft are operational due to issues brought about by fuel shortages, maintenance, and pilot training limitations. Despite this, the KPAF has struggled to maintain its operational readiness.

The new missile addresses one of the major vulnerabilities in North Korea’s air defence, which increasingly relies on ground-based systems such as the Pyongae-5 [KN-06]—a surface-to-air missile with a comparable range to Russia’s S-300.

The 2017 unveiling of the KN-06 demonstrates North Korea’s emphasis on asymmetric defence to counterbalance its ageing fleet of fighter jets. However, the unveiling of this new air-to-air missile represents a change of course toward expanding aerial combat capability, especially in defending large military bases and cities.

Operationally, the missile enables MiG-29s to strike enemies at a distance, eschewing close-range dogfighting necessary with older weapons like the R-60, an 8-kilometre infrared-guided missile.

With the transition to BVR combat, the North Korean strategy is now closer to that of modern air warfare, where battles are fought at distances larger than the range of sight.

Integrating the MiG-29 with this missile is not straightforward. The 1980s-vintage avionics and radar equipment of the aircraft restrict their use of the missile’s capabilities to their full potential, especially in sophisticated electronic warfare environments.

The MiG-29 is not stealthy and lacks sophisticated data-linking systems needed for network-centric warfare, especially when compared to newer combat aircraft like the U.S. F-22 Raptor and South Korea’s F-35A Lightning II. For example, South Korea has more than 60 F-35As, which are extremely resistant to North Korea’s old radar technologies due to their low-observable configuration and sophisticated sensors.

United States Air Force

The United States Air Force also has a large presence in the region with F-16s, A-10s, and F-35s in Japan and South Korea. These aircraft, augmented by airborne early warning and control assets like the E-7 Wedgetail, give allied military forces a significant situational awareness and target capability advantage.

On the other hand, the new North Korean missile seems to have evolved from existing designs. The United States has the American AIM-120 AMRAAM, the benchmark for BVR combat, with its active radar-guided homing and 180 km of range in its two latest variants.

The Russian R-77, with its 110-kilometre operational range and equivalent guidance capability, may have inspired North Korea’s missile technology. In addition, the visual similarity of the North Korean missile to China’s PL-12, which reportedly has a maximum range of 100 kilometres, raises suspicions about technology transfers.

North Korea asserts that they manufacture the missile domestically, yet growing ties with Russia stoke speculation about foreign assistance. Reports suggest Russia is helping modernise North Korea’s military. In December 2024, Admiral Samuel Paparo said Russia offered MiG-29 and Su-27 jets to Pyongyang. This acquisition was reportedly in exchange for North Korean troops aiding Russia’s war in Ukraine.

Analyst Shin Seung-ki

On December 8, 2024, Aviation Week reported the same agreement, citing U.S. Indo-Pacific Command sources. Despite operating older fourth-generation aircraft, this deal would boost North Korea’s struggling air force. The fleet currently has trouble staying operational and sourcing spare parts. Analyst Shin Seung-ki believes Russia likely provided technical assistance for North Korea’s recent air defence missile tests.

Along with the MiG-29, Pyongyang could acquire the Su-27, a long-range air superiority fighter. The Su-27 can fly at Mach 2.35 and climb to 18,500 metres. It uses the Phazotron N001 Myech radar and carries up to ten air-to-air missiles. These include the R-27 and R-73. While lacking stealth and advanced sensors, the Su-27 is highly manoeuvrable with fly-by-wire controls. This attribute makes it dangerous in air-to-air combat.

The L-SAM programme

Its combat performance would still depend on pilot skill and proper maintenance. These remain weaknesses in the Korean People’s Air Force. Still, having these fighters would help North Korea use its new missile system effectively. The missile’s unveiling comes amid rising tensions on the Korean Peninsula. On January 16, 2025, South Korea approved production of its L-SAM missile defence system. The L-SAM programme, worth $1.19 billion, aims to counter North Korean ballistic missile threats.

Released in the late 2020s, the system reflects Seoul’s focus on a balanced defence posture. On March 21, 2025, North Korean media said Kim Jong Un oversaw testing of a new anti-air missile system. The test confirmed Pyongyang’s commitment to strengthening its air defence capabilities. These moves highlight a regional arms race as North Korea tries to match U.S. and allied advances.

Historically, North Korea’s air force has played limited but symbolic roles in conflicts. Soviet accounts say during the Vietnam War, Kim Il Sung told pilots to treat it as their own skies. In 1973, North Korean MiG-21s helped Egypt defend its airspace.

Defensive Air Capability

Today, Pyongyang’s air capabilities are mostly defensive, focused on protecting airspace and key assets. Still, past deployments show North Korea’s willingness to project air power beyond its borders. The new missile allows MiG-29s to counter threats from greater distances.

It may deter U.S. and South Korean surveillance flights over disputed airspace. The missile’s ability to disrupt regional air operations makes it strategically important. To counter MiG-29s with BVR missiles, South Korea and the U.S. need advanced SEAD tactics.

Longer missile ranges may force allies to revise reconnaissance and strike missions near North Korean borders. The F-35’s stealth and sensors make it ideal for such missions. Japan should also prepare for this threat with its F-15Js and F-35s.

Sanctions since 2006

North Korea has previously launched missiles through Japanese airspace in provocative acts. Despite its progress, North Korea struggles to sustain its program. Sanctions since 2006 prevent them from buying advanced military equipment and components.

It must rely on local production with limited foreign support. Years of isolation have strained its economy, limiting its ability to sustain a large combat-ready air force. It also cannot mass-produce advanced weapons.

Limited pilot training and few operational MiG-29s further reduce its strategic strength. Even with the new missile, North Korea cannot match U.S. fifth-generation fighters or South Korea’s F-35s. The missile’s unveiling raises questions about Pyongyang’s long-term military goals.

State media showed Kim inspecting air-to-ground missiles for the MiG-29. This suggests a push to expand the jet’s multirole capabilities. North Korea could try to buy upgraded MiG-29s or Su-27s from Russia.

Such deals depend on maintenance capability and Russia bypassing U.N. sanctions. Pyongyang may deepen ties with Moscow to offset its technological gaps. Evidence includes troop exchanges and documented arms transfers between the two.

Overall, the missile programme signals internal strength and deterrence against regional adversaries. The timing counters South Korea’s announcement of the L-SAM missile defence system. The missile’s true value depends on North Korea’s ability to produce and integrate it under sanctions.

Conclusion

For now, this breakthrough is a testament to Pyongyang’s continuing efforts, despite insurmountable challenges, to accelerate the modernisation of its military. This missile’s development raises a direct question: can North Korea turn it into a real strategic advantage over its adversaries?

Policymakers and military strategists must now assess the regional security impact as Pyongyang pushes forward with this new capability. Although the full gains remain unclear, North Korea has introduced a development that demands close attention and a thoughtful response.

References

1. KCNA Watch—North Korea’s official state media aggregator
2. Defense News Today—North Korean missile test updates
3. Aviation Week report on Russia–North Korea fighter jet deal
4. Korea Herald report on L-SAM development
5. GlobalSecurity.org – MiG-29 Fulcrum details
6. Military Watch Magazine—North Korea’s new missile developments
7. The Diplomat—Analysis of North Korea’s air force
8. South Korean Ministry of National Defense
9. United States Indo-Pacific Command statements
10. Reuters—North Korea missile and defence developments