German Leopard 2 Tank
On April 11, 2025, Bojan Pancevski of The Wall Street Journal highlighted a troubling report from the German defense industry. German weapons sent to Ukraine, including NATO’s top platforms, are reportedly underperforming on the battlefield.
An internal Bundeswehr document revealed that systems like the Leopard tank and Panzerhaubitze 2000 are difficult and costly to maintain. Their complex upkeep reduces their operational value in fast-moving, high-intensity conflicts like the one in Ukraine.
In contrast, older Cold War-era weapons such as the Marder and Gepard are proving more reliable and adaptable. These legacy systems have earned praise for their consistent performance under prolonged battlefield conditions.
This comparison reveals deep-rooted issues in how Western militaries design and sustain modern weapons for long wars. Ukraine’s war has become a proving ground for NATO equipment, revealing unexpected weaknesses under real combat pressure.
Western gear, often built for short, decisive battles, now faces the demands of grinding, attrition-based warfare. Modern systems struggle with constant wear, while older platforms require fewer resources to stay combat-ready.
Krauss-Maffei Wegmann
Despite its technical impressiveness, the Panzerhaubitze 2000 has not met battlefield expectations in the rugged and mobile combat environment of Ukraine. Krauss-Maffei Wegmann and Rheinmetall developed the Panzerhaubitze 2000, and Germany adopted it in 1998.
It features a 155 mm L52 gun capable of firing 10 rounds per minute with a 40-kilometer range. Although it is powerful, the Panzerhaubitze 2000 requires heavy maintenance and a stable logistics chain to remain operational.
Such needs are difficult to meet in Ukraine’s fluid and often chaotic frontline conditions. As a result, even the best Western artillery can fall short without constant support and resupply. Ukraine’s war is reshaping how nations assess weapons—not just by specs, but by real-world resilience.
NATO’s highly proficient howitzer, with its automated loading mechanism and advanced fire control, can deliver precise and destructive barrages.
In theory, it is groundbreaking, capable of exceeding numerous Russian systems, including the 2S19 Msta-S, which possesses a shorter range of 24 miles with standard munitions.
Nonetheless, its complexity incurs a cost. The intricate hydraulics, electronics, and high-precision components of the system necessitate meticulous maintenance—an aspect that Ukraine’s strained logistics cannot provide.
Leopard 2A6 variant
Limited spare parts and the intense pace of combat—where howitzers occasionally discharge thousands of rounds beyond their designated cycles—have led to malfunctions that cannot be swiftly rectified in the field.
The Leopard tanks, especially the Leopard 2A6 variant, face similar challenges. Initially introduced in 1979 and enhanced over the years, the Leopard 2 is a cornerstone of German armored combat.
The composite armor provides robust protection, and the 120mm Rheinmetall L55 smoothbore gun can penetrate most modern armor.
It can go as fast as 42 miles per hour thanks to its 1,500-horsepower engine. This gives it a favorable balance between firepower, protection, and mobility—something rivals like the American M1 Abrams and the Russian T-90 try to copy.
The Leopard 2’s fire control system enables it to precisely engage targets while in motion. NATO drills, which simulated quick counterattacks against Soviet forces, enhanced this skill. In Ukraine, these tanks are sometimes used as static artillery, for which they were not designed.
The maintenance requirements for the Leopard 2A6 are substantial, as indicated by the Bundeswehr report; repairs occasionally necessitate specialized facilities located far from the front lines.
Despite its streamlined design enhancing performance, the older Leopard 1A5 has insufficient armor to withstand modern anti-tank weaponry, thereby constraining its efficacy.
Gepard and Marder
Conversely, relics from West Germany’s Cold War arsenal, such as the Gepard and Marder, have demonstrated remarkable resilience. Krauss-Maffei developed the self-propelled anti-aircraft system Flakpanzer Gepard in the 1970s, utilizing a Leopard 1 chassis.
It can destroy drones, helicopters, or low-flying jets at a rate of 1,100 rounds per minute, thanks to its two 35 mm Oerlikon cannons.
The advanced radar-guided targeting system of the tanks allows them to precisely track and attack multiple targets. Germany removed the Gepard from service in 2012, but Ukraine successfully reintroduced it.
Ukrainian forces praise their ability to counter Russia’s barrage of Shahed drones, which are significantly less expensive than the missiles employed by systems like the Patriot.
The Gepard’s mechanical simplicity facilitates maintenance with basic tools; its ammunition, while not inexpensive, is less costly than advanced air-defense missiles.
The Gepard is unmatched in its category when juxtaposed with Russia’s ZSU-23-4 Shilka, a contemporaneous system equipped with less precise 23 mm cannons.
Commissioned in 1971, the Marder infantry fighting vehicle tells a similar story. Engineered by Rheinmetall, it is equipped with a 20 mm autocannon and offers options for Milan anti-tank missiles, accommodating six to seven personnel.
Its steel armor provides protection against small arms fire and shrapnel, while its 600-horsepower diesel engine enables speeds of 46 miles per hour.
Puma Replaces Marder
The Marder’s ventilation system, originating from Cold War concerns regarding nuclear conflict, provides protection against chemical threats.
Deutschland is discontinuing the Marder in favor of the more advanced Puma; however, in Ukraine, the Marder has demonstrated reliability in transporting troops and providing fire support in challenging conditions.
Despite being more contemporary, Russia’s BMP-3 suffers from inadequate armor and complex electronics that malfunction during extended combat, whereas its uncomplicated design stands in stark contrast.
The Marder’s ease of repair—a characteristic that mirrors the durability of American systems, such as the Bradley, which similarly balances firepower and maintainability—is emphasized in the Bundeswehr report.
Why do these older systems outperform their more contemporary counterparts? The context of their design partially elucidates the response. West Germany was apprehensive about a significant Soviet incursion through the Fulda Gap during the Cold War.
Engineered for prolonged conflict, systems like Gepard and Marder prioritize reliability and rapid field maintenance. Engineers prioritize durability over aesthetics because they anticipate strained supply chains and overloaded workshops.
However, modern systems have changed since the end of the Cold War. After the Soviet threat went away, NATO turned its attention to expeditionary warfare, which means short, high-tech battles against opponents who aren’t as well prepared. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are examples of this.
Ukraine’s conflict
Conceived as scenarios where air dominance and robust logistics could be guaranteed, Panzerhaubitze 2000 and Leopard 2 were Ukraine’s conflicts, characterized by persistent artillery exchanges and contested airspace.
They resemble the protracted battles of World War II more than the precision strikes typical of the twenty-first century. Germany is not singular in experiencing this disconnection.
Rob Lee, a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, has noted that numerous NATO systems provided to Ukraine are “excessively intricate and challenging to sustain” under these conditions.
He identifies the slow production rates of Western defense firms as a major obstacle that worsens the shortage of spare components.
During the Cold War, NATO stored parts in case of a possible war with the Warsaw Pact. Today, the defense industry uses just-in-time manufacturing, which is best for budgeting during times of peace. Lee also talks about how quickly these systems were added to the Ukrainian military.
Training, usually lasting weeks instead of months, allows Ukrainian crews to gain proficiency on complex platforms like the Panzerhaubitze 2000.
Nevertheless, he asserts that certain units still regard it as the premier artillery system for the conflict due to its precision and firepower, demonstrating its potential when adequately supported.
Panzerhaubitze 2000 howitzers
The logistical challenges extend beyond Ukraine’s borders. R Records from the German government indicate that Germany has supplied 25 Panzerhaubitze 2000 howitzers, 18 Leopard 2A6 tanks, and numerous Gepard and Marder vehicles. All systems display spare components; however, the supply chain deteriorates due to the exigencies of warfare.
Despite Rheinmetall establishing a repair facility in Ukraine, the management of heavy systems’ operations remains inadequate. More complex repairs require transportation to facilities in Poland or Germany, which results in the equipment being out of service for weeks. This instance illustrates challenges faced by other NATO contributors.
The U.S. has struggled to maintain its HIMARS rocket launchers in Ukraine because domestic support is typically necessary for their upkeep.
In contrast, Russia relies on less advanced systems like the T-72 tank, which can be repaired with basic tools, an unfortunate advantage in an attrition-based war.
We have scrutinized the historical preparedness of the Bundeswehr, elucidating the origins of these challenges. A 2018 report indicated that due to shortages of spare parts and insufficient funding, only a small percentage of Germany’s tanks and aircraft were operationally ready.
Friedrich Merz
The incursion into Ukraine prompted the establishment of a €100 billion defense fund to modernize the Bundeswehr; however, the restoration of industrial capacity requires time.
Germany’s incoming chancellor, Friedrich Merz, has pledged increased funding, indicating a heightened awareness of the nation’s military stance.
This parallels concerns in the United States, where analysts question the capability of America’s defense industry to sustain a prolonged conflict with a peer competitor such as China due to a shared dependence on high-tech, low-stockpile systems.
The ongoing war in Ukraine is also changing NATO’s perspective on its military arsenal. The effectiveness of the Gepard against drones has sparked interest in reviving similar systems.
The U.S. is considering short-range air defenses such as the Army M-SHORAD to address unmanned threats, a task at which the Gepard excels.
The Marder’s reliability indicates that older platforms, frequently deemed obsolete, may require modernization instead of replacement. Despite their challenges, the Panzerhaubitze 2000 and Leopard 2 retain formidable capabilities with adequate support.
Older Soviet Systems
The howitzer’s ability to accurately target Russian positions has pleased Ukrainian crews and has surpassed the capabilities of older Soviet systems like the D-30.
NATO’s assumed factors—logistics and training—dictate the efficacy of contemporary systems, not their flaws.
The Bundeswehr analysis raises concerns about NATO’s broader strategy. If a regional conflict like that in Ukraine were to disrupt Western supply chains, what would a global crisis necessitate?
Despite the United States augmenting production of 155 mm shells, output continues to fall short of Ukraine’s consumption rate. Germany faces similar constraints; Rheinmetall plans to enhance ammunition production solely by 2026.
The accumulation of millions of rounds by NATO to counter Soviet advancement epitomized Cold War apprehensions. NATO now confronts a challenging balance between funding future technology and meeting basic battlefield needs.
Conclusion
Investing in hypersonic weapons is important, but maintaining a sufficient number of tanks, ammunition, and spare parts for prolonged conflicts is equally essential. Cold War-era systems like the Gepard and Marder remind us that simplicity can thrive in messy, unpredictable combat zones.
Built during tense times, these older platforms were designed to last and function under sustained pressure. Modern systems, while advanced, often assume support that doesn’t exist on today’s fluid and fragmented Ukrainian front lines.
This contrast does not imply that modern weapons have completely failed; rather, it highlights the significant challenges posed by wartime conditions. The Panzerhaubitze 2000 and Leopard 2 have delivered strong results when working properly.
They have dealt serious damage, proving their worth under the right conditions despite facing maintenance and logistical struggles. Their performance highlights the sheer intensity of combat, not necessarily flaws in their design.
However, NATO must rethink how it builds and supports advanced systems for prolonged conflicts. The alliance must prepare for wars that demand endurance, not just swift victories or showcase technologies.
Adapting NATO’s industry and doctrines to address this new reality remains a massive and urgent challenge. Can the West rebuild its staying power in war, or will it keep relying on fragile peacetime designs?
This question now looms large as Ukraine’s battlefields test Western systems in ways never seen before. The question remains unresolved, overshadowing every tank deployed and every shell discharged in the conflict in Ukraine.
References
- Bojan Pancevski – Wall Street Journal, April 11, 2025
https://www.wsj.com - Bundeswehr Equipment Analysis – German Defence Ministry Internal Reports
https://www.bmvg.de - Foreign Policy Research Institute – Rob Lee Commentary
https://www.fpri.org - Rheinmetall AG – Official Website
https://www.rheinmetall.com - Krauss-Maffei Wegmann (KMW)—Official Website
https://www.kmweg.de - Defense News Today – NATO Weapons in Ukraine
https://www.defensenewstoday.info - Facebook – Pakistan Defence Forum
https://www.facebook.com/groups/pakistandefenseforum - U.S. Army Acquisition Support Center – M-SHORAD Overview
https://asc.army.mil - NATO – Cold War Strategy and Stockpile Doctrine
https://www.nato.int
