Uzbekistan and Chinese Fighters
According to recent reports, China has approved the sale of sophisticated fighter jets to Uzbekistan, a development that reflects Beijing and the Central Asian nation’s growing military partnership. While there hasn’t been an official announcement about the specific model, sources close to Uzbekistan’s Ministry of Defence say that the deal might involve advanced planes like the JF-17 Block III, J-10C, or even the new J-35.
At the same time, Uzbekistan has been gradually integrating Chinese air defense systems, including the HQ-9B, FM-90, and KS-1C, as part of a thorough overhaul of its outdated Soviet-era stockpile. This new development raises questions about the shifting balance of power in Central Asia and marks a strategic change for Uzbekistan, a country historically dependent on Russian military hardware.
In a historically major-power-influenced region, this agreement could mark a new era for China’s ambitions as a global arms supplier and for Uzbekistan’s air force. The Su-27 and MiG-29, two Soviet-designed aircraft that are nearing the end of their useful lives, have been the mainstays of Uzbekistan’s air force.
Designed for air superiority
These fourth-generation fighters were first introduced in the 1980s and were considered state-of-the-art, but they are currently unable to compete with the capabilities of contemporary platforms. Designed for air superiority, the Su-27 was a twin-engined heavy fighter with a maximum speed of Mach 2.35 and a combat radius of approximately 1,500 kilometres.
Due to its agility and thrust-vectoring engines, the MiG-29, its counterpart, is superior in dogfights; however, its payload and range are inferior to those of heavier aircraft. Both aircraft are limited by outdated avionics and high maintenance expenses, which have plagued post-Soviet forces for many years.
Uzbekistan’s need to modernise its air fleet has been obvious for years. Earlier reports suggested interest in France’s Rafale or Russia’s Su-30SM. However, shifting towards Chinese aircraft appears to be a practical move shaped by cost and geopolitical realities. The JF-17 Block III is a lightweight, multirole fighter co-developed by China and Pakistan.
Russian Klimov RD-93 engine
Reports suggest Uzbekistan is currently evaluating this platform for possible acquisition. Priced at around $30 million per unit, the JF-17 is much cheaper than Western or Russian alternatives. Those alternatives often exceed $80 million per aircraft, putting them out of reach for many developing nations. Powered by the Russian Klimov RD-93 engine, the JF-17 reaches speeds up to Mach 1.6.
It can carry up to 4,000 kilograms of weapons, including PL-12 missiles and precision-guided bombs. The KLJ-7A radar detects targets up to 170 kilometres away, enabling beyond-visual-range missile launches. These capabilities are vital in modern air combat, where seeing the enemy first can mean victory. The Block III variant debuted in the early 2020s and includes AESA radar and modern electronic warfare systems.
These upgrades make it comparable to older Western fighters like the F-16 Block 50. While affordable and versatile, the JF-17 depends heavily on Chinese supply chains for maintenance and parts. That long-term reliance raises concerns about logistics and future readiness. Another option is the J-10C, a more advanced fighter made by China’s Chengdu Aerospace Corporation. It features a delta wing and canard foreplanes, giving it excellent agility and 9G turn capability.
Exported Versions
Powered by the WS-10B engine, the J-10C can reach Mach 1.8 and has a 550-km combat radius. Aerial refuelling can extend its range, increasing its operational flexibility. The J-10C stands out for its AESA radar and long-range PL-15 missile. China claims the PL-15 can travel 300 kilometres, though the exported versions are likely limited to 90 miles.
This range gives it an edge in long-distance engagements, similar to the U.S. AIM-120D missile. It carries various weapons, including anti-ship missiles and laser-guided bombs, making it a true multirole platform. Costing about $50 million per unit, it remains cheaper than Western jets like the $120 million Rafale. The J-35, China’s new stealth fighter, made its debut at the 2024 Airshow China. It’s designed for aircraft carriers and aims to compete with the U.S. F-35.
With a tailless flying-wing shape, the J-35 reduces radar visibility but is less stealthy than the F-35. Estimates suggest the J-35 has a radar cross-section of 0.1–0.5 m², versus 0.001 m² for the F-35. Twin WS-19 engines power it at Mach 1.8 with a 1,200-kilometre combat radius. Its sensors include AESA radar and infrared search, allowing teamwork with drones and ground systems.
HQ-9B is often compared to Russia’s S-300
Four PL-15s can fit in its internal bay, preserving stealth while allowing external payloads in non-stealth missions. It is a high-end option, valued at about $100 million, and exporting it to Uzbekistan would be a bold move for China, showing confidence in its technology and a willingness to share cutting-edge systems with allies.
Uzbekistan’s purchase of Chinese air defense systems improves these aircraft, creating a multi-tiered defense system. The long-range surface-to-air missile system known as the HQ-9B is often compared to Russia’s S-300.
It can target aircraft, cruise missiles, and ballistic threats at 50-kilometre altitudes thanks to its 200-kilometre range. The phased-array radar is an effective defense against modern air forces because it can simultaneously monitor several threats.
The FM-90 is a short-range system specifically designed for low-altitude defense against drones and cruise missiles within 15 kilometres. Its highly manoeuvrable infrared-guided missiles quickly destroy incoming threats with precision.
The KS-1C system engages targets up to 70 kilometres away using radar-guided missiles for medium-to-long-range defense. China’s command-and-control systems link these platforms, forming a unified defense network for seamless coordination. This network can integrate with aircraft like the J-10C or J-35 to enable joint operations.
AESA vs PESA
Uzbekistan’s transition to using Chinese hardware encounters a complex geopolitical environment. Russia’s sphere of influence has traditionally been Central Asia, where Moscow supplies most of the military infrastructure. Uzbekistan’s air force, established on Soviet foundations, relied on Russian spare parts and technical assistance well into the 21st century. However, Russia’s dependability as a supplier has diminished.
Sanctions related to its actions in Ukraine, along with production constraints, have restricted Moscow’s capacity to supply advanced systems such as the Su-30SM, a twin-engine multirole fighter that Uzbekistan is said to have contemplated.
The Su-30SM, equipped with PESA radar and a combat radius of 1,500 kilometres, is a competent platform; however, its $70 million cost and extended delivery schedules diminish its appeal.
France’s Rafale is another option, offering advanced features like AESA radar, Meteor missiles that can hit targets 150 kilometres away, and a proven track record in combat; however, its high cost and the political issues tied to France’s support of Western interests probably made Tashkent think twice.
China, however, provides a strong alternative. China’s weapons are accessible, reasonably priced, and have minimal ideological ties. Beijing prioritises economic ties over political influence when it comes to arms sales, prioritising pragmatism.
This allows Uzbekistan to maintain its relationships with important allies while modernising its military. The country has continuously sought to manage its relations with China, Russia, and Western nations in an independent manner.
Uzbek Air Force
Recently, Uzbekistan and Beijing have strengthened their economic relations through the Belt and Road Initiative. Government officials project that Chinese investments in Uzbekistan’s infrastructure and energy sectors will exceed $9 billion by 2024. China aims to boost its influence in Central Asia—a region crucial for trade routes and energy security.
Given this context, establishing deeper military ties between China and Uzbekistan is a logical next step. Uzbekistan’s choice of Chinese jets and air defences reflects both strategic needs and operational realities.
The Uzbek Air Force operates with fewer than 50 combat aircraft, yet it plays a vital role in ensuring national security. It defends a vast area—447,400 square kilometres—bordering five different countries.
Threats include instability from Afghanistan and border tensions over waterways and territory with neighbouring states. The JF-17 Block III is affordable and ideal for quick strikes against insurgents or lightly armed intruders.
The J-10C has a longer range and could deter more advanced threats in the region. The J-35, although it is still unconfirmed, would provide Uzbekistan with a psychological advantage due to its stealth capabilities.
Air defense systems will guard key locations, like the Fergana Valley, home to major infrastructure and a high population density. Uzbekistan has traditionally modernised its forces cautiously and under tight financial constraints.
Air Defense Systems
After independence in 1991, it inherited ageing Soviet equipment that quickly became outdated. Efforts to modernise have faced delays due to their cost and dependency on Russian support. Delays affected a 2017 deal for 12 Russian Mi-35 helicopters, resulting in only eight being delivered by 2020. China’s arrival offers Uzbekistan a faster route to modernisation without those historical bottlenecks.
After the acquisition, Uzbekistan quickly deployed Chinese HQ-9B and FM-90 air defense systems. A February 2025 Defence Blog report confirmed integration took just months, a major step forward. Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan’s neighbour, also bought similar systems, showing a regional shift towards Chinese defense solutions. Uzbekistan is moving quickly to strengthen its military and diversify its defense partnerships.
The implications of this agreement extend beyond the borders of Uzbekistan. Central Asia serves as a testing ground for China’s defence industry, which has struggled to compete with more established nations like the US and Russia.
Global, according to Jane’s Defense Weekly
The JF-17 has secured buyers in both Pakistan and Myanmar, and Pakistan expects to have over 150 of these aircraft in service by 2025. These aircraft will be in service by 2025. According to Arab News, China has exported the J-10C to Pakistan, delivering 25 units since 2022.
F Foreign operators have not yet evaluated the J-35; however, a deal with Uzbekistan would represent a significant breakthrough for China. Such a transaction would demonstrate China’s ability to compete with Lockheed Martin’s F-35, the global leader in stealth exports.
Lockheed Martin has sold over 900 F-35s worldwide, thereby dominating the fifth-generation fighter export market. In contrast, Russia has confirmed only one foreign buyer—Algeria—for its Su-57 stealth fighter.
Russia is expected to begin Su-57 deliveries to Algeria in late 2025. China’s strategy goes beyond merely focusing on sales numbers. Beijing is providing Uzbekistan with integrated systems as part of a technology demonstration.
A successful deployment may influence other regional actors, like Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, that face similar modernisation challenges. According to a 2024 Eurasianet report, Kazakhstan operates 39 MiG-29s, but maintenance issues have grounded many of them.
Chinese Aircraft
Due to their superior logistics and lower initial costs, Chinese systems could help close the gap. Beijing also utilises empirical data from Uzbekistan’s military operations to improve its designs. China, which has historically relied on domestic testing, is unfamiliar with this feedback loop that is typical of Western defense industries.
The financial details of the agreement are also informative. Despite being less expensive, buying Chinese aircraft necessitates a large investment in infrastructure and training. Uzbekistan must adjust its supply chains because the JF-17 fighter jet uses ammunition that conforms to Chinese standards. It may take years to train pilots in China or Pakistan, delaying full operational capability.
A 2023 study by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies estimated that transitioning to new fighter platforms incurs costs of $500 million to $1 billion for small air forces over a decade, excluding the expenses of aircraft acquisitions.
U.S. State Department.
Uzbekistan’s ability to cover these costs without outside help—possibly in the form of Chinese loans or barter agreements—is limited by the World Bank’s $800 million 2024 defense budget. This development signifies a subtle yet significant shift for the United States.
Central Asia has not served as a principal arena for American influence; however, Washington has sustained relations with Uzbekistan via counterterrorism collaboration and economic assistance, amounting to $1.5 billion since 1992, according to the U.S. State Department.
The shift towards Chinese weapons complicates regional dynamics rather than directly endangering U.S.-Uzbekistan relationships. Export restrictions prevent technology transfers, and Uzbekistan cannot afford to purchase $60 million U.S. aircraft such as the F-16. China’s willingness to share sophisticated systems, albeit not the best, fills a gap that American policy has largely ignored.
Conclusion
This agreement reflects the evolving nature of the global arms trade. According to SIPRI data from 2020 to 2024, the United States and Russia continue to lead the world in arms exports, accounting for 36% and 16% of total exports, respectively. China’s market share has increased to 6% thanks to sales to Asia and Africa.
Cost-effective systems with minimal political consequences attract countries like Uzbekistan, enabling them to gain capabilities without becoming entangled. Unlike the U.S., which is under congressional oversight, and Russia, which faces sanctions, China can deliver its products discreetly and quickly. This flexibility could change markets where price is more important than status.
Ultimately, Uzbekistan’s alignment with China is more about ensuring its future stability than about choosing sides. The nation is utilising Beijing’s aspirations to enhance its defences, simultaneously maintaining a distance from both Russia and the West.
The agreement presents China with an opportunity to demonstrate its hardware in a novel arena, thereby enhancing its credibility for prospective sales. The sustainability of this partnership depends on effective execution: can Uzbekistan successfully integrate these systems, and will China meet its commitments?
The solutions are forthcoming, yet currently, the skies above Central Asia serve as a testing ground for an innovative military alliance that contests traditional beliefs and prompts new enquiries regarding the locus of power.
References
- Defence Blog – Uzbekistan integrates HQ-9B and FM-90 systems
- Jane’s Defence Weekly—China’s JF-17 exports
- Arab News—Pakistan receives J-10C fighters from China
- Eurasianet—Kazakhstan’s MiG-29 fleet faces issues
- Stockholm International Peace Research Institute – Uzbekistan’s Mi-35 delays
- China Power – JF-17 Block III development and export
- Global Times – J-35 showcased at Airshow China 2024
- Ministry of Investment and Foreign Trade of Uzbekistan – China investment figures
